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Abstract
The paper studies the impact of homophily on the optimal strategies of a monopolist, whose marketing campaign of new product relies on a word of mouth communication. Homophily is a tendency of people to interact more with those who are similar to
them. In the model there are two types of consumers embedded into a social network,
which differ in friendship preferences and desirable design of product. Consumers can
learn about the product directly from an advertisement or from their neighbors. The
monopolist chooses the product design and price to influence a pattern of communication among consumers. We find a number of results: (i) for low levels of homophily
the product attractive to both types of consumers is preferred to specialized products;
(ii) the price elasticity is increasing in homophily; (iii) an increase in the homophily
benefits both the monopolist and consumers; and (iv) the product attractive to both
types may be optimal even if the monopolist obtains profits only from sales to one
type of consumers.
JEL Classification numbers: D21, D42, D60, D83, L11, L12
Keywords: networks, word of mouth, viral marketing, homophily, diffusion, social
networks, random graphs, monopoly, pricing strategy, product design, marketing, advertisement

1

Introduction

In the last decade word of mouth (WOM hereafter) and viral marketing have received a
considerable amount of attention from mass-media and the scientific community as efficient
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marketing tools (see for instance Campbell, 2009, Goyal and Galeotti, 2007, Leskovec et al.
2007, and Iribarren and Moro, 2007). The idea that a company can recruit consumers to
advertise its products for free is really exciting. The WOM marketing takes an advantage
of the natural human’s inclination to spread information. A recent study by Reichheld
(2003) shows that willingness of consumers to recommend a company to their friends not
just augments sales, but by far is the best predictor of a company’s growth.
Apart from being efficient when it works, performance of a WOM campaign is quite
uncertain. A report by Riley and Wigder (2007) from Jupiter Research reveals that only
15% of viral campaigns are considered to be successful, moreover 55% of companies planned
to reduce the use of this tactics next year. This raises the question why companies that
face the same network of consumers show so different performance in terms of success
of WOM campaigns? In the paper we argue that volatile behavior of WOM marketing
campaigns at least partially can be explained by a phenomenon known as “homophily”.
Homophily is a tendency of people to interact more with those who are similar to them,
which has been documented at least since Aristotle’s time.1 , 2
Our paper contributes to the WOM literature in two dimensions. First and most
importantly, the paper introduces homophily into the network upon which WOM spreads
and studies its impact on the optimal strategy of the monopolist. The notion of homophily
enriches network structure by specifying a probability of friendship relationships among
groups of consumers. Second, the paper extends the monopolist’s problem by including
product design that affects further WOM communication. To the author’s best knowledge
product design has not been the subject of academic research in WOM framework.
The description of the model is following. There is a monopolist that introduces a
new product to an initially uninformed population of heterogeneous consumers of two
types. Consumers are embedded into a social network, which is represented by a random
graph with an arbitrary degree distribution. Across types, consumers differ in friendship
preferences and desirable design of the product. Within types, consumers differ in a
willingness to pay for the product. We model consumers friendship preferences by a linking
bias towards types, which represents homophily of the society. Consumers communicate
with their friends and learn about the existence of the product from neighbors who already
have acquired it. The monopolist knows the degree distribution and homophily level of
the society and strategically chooses the price and design of the product. To induce sales
the monopolist advertises the product directly to an infinitesimal part of the population
and the rest of the population is expected to find out about the product through WOM
communication.
1

In Aristotles Rhetoric and Nichomachean Ethics, he noted that people “love those who are like
themselves” (Aristotle 1934, p. 1371).
2
The term homophily appeared in the sociological literature for the first time in Lazarsfeld and Mertons
(1954) who also quoted the proverbial expression - “birds of a feather flock together,” which has summarized
homophily ever since.
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Our analysis begins by examining a necessary conditions on a network structure such
that WOM can spread over a significant proportion of the population3 . This was a case
of such remarkable examples of WOM campaigns as diffusion of Hotmail accounts4 and
the advertising campaign of tiny budget movie “The Blair Witch Project”5 . We find that
in the case of sparse networks a sufficiently high level of homophily is a necessary for a
successful WOM campaign. High levels of homophily imply that preferences of connected
consumers are correlated, which allows the monopolist to develop the product attractive
for longer chains of connected consumers.
Next, we turn to the optimal design of the product. The commonly employed assumption in the diffusion literature is that a message to be spread in a network is given, and
main focus is upon the effect of network structure on its propagation (for a survey see
Geroski, 2000). In contrast, we assume an active role of the monopolist. In the model the
monopolist designs a message to the network by choosing the price and characteristic of
the product. In our base-line model we find that for sufficiently high levels of homophily,
when people mostly interact with those who are similar to them, specialized products
designed to target needs of one type of consumers are optimal. However, for sufficiently
low levels of homophily, the product attractive for both types of consumers is preferred to
specialized design even if there is no cost of producing more than one product. The latter
happens, since the majority of links connect consumers of different types and to insure
spreading the product should be attractive to both types.
The sociological literature on homophily adopts a view that diversity of individual’s
contacts is a socially desirable property per se (e.g. Moody, 2001). Although this assertion
could be supported by evidence, no rigorous analysis has been made. Perhaps surprisingly,
in our model social welfare is increasing in the level of homophily. The result comes from
informational and monetary benefits for consumers generated by an increase in the level
of homophily. Informational benefits consist in a higher awareness of consumers about the
product. Monetary benefits come from a lower price charged by the monopolist, which
converts a higher awareness of the product into a higher volume of sales.
There is a popular idea in business and academic literature that focusing advertisement
efforts on a group of consumers is the efficient strategy. We show that it is indeed true an advertisement strategy of targeting consumers of one group is optimal. However, the
same does not always hold for the product design even when advertisement is targeted to
one group. In the case when the society exhibits low levels of homophily the optimality
of product specialization depends on the density of a social network. If the density is
low then the expected demand triggered per advertisement is small and the monopolist
specializes on a group of consumers targeted by the advertisement. If the network density
3

In the network literature this phenomenon is known as a global cascade
Hotmail spent a mere 50,000 dollars on traditional marketing and still grew from zero to 12 million
users in 18 months.
5
A movie released in 1999 with principal photography budget ranging from $20,000 to $25,000.
4
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is sufficiently high then it is optimal for the monopolist to choose compromise design. This
strategy sacrifices some initial adopters from the targeted group, but insures that initial
acquisition leads to higher level of WOM communication.
A term “freakonomics” has firmly entered to vocabularies of many economists. The
popular book of the same name6 with over 3 million copies sold worldwide gained popularity not only among a general public, but became well known in the academic community
(e.g. DiNardo, 2006, DiNardo 2007, Rubinstein, 2006). The case of “Freakonomics” is
not unique. One can recall such examples as “Linked: The New Science of Networks” on
networks by Barabási, “The Selfish Gene” on evolution by Richard Dawkins etc. All these
books provoked numerous discussions in the academic circles, while the primary audience
was the general public. Influenced by this phenomenon, we consider the monopolist that
is interested only in one type of consumer (for instance the academic community). We
show that designing a product attractive to both types of consumers may be the optimal
strategy, even though monopolist benefits only from one type.

1.1

Related Literature

In this section we relate our paper to two streams of the networks literature. The first
one studies strategic diffusion of information in networks with underlying assumption that
nodes are matched randomly (see, for instance, Campbell, 2009, Goyal and Galeotti, 2007,
Galeotti and Mattozzi, 2008). The second stream of the literature studies the impact of
homophily on various processes unfolding on networks (for instance Golub and Jackson,
2009, Van der Leij et al., 2009, Buhai and Van der Leij, 2008 and Valat, 2009). Our paper
bridges these two streams in a simple model, which studies the impact of social structure,
given by the homophily, on the diffusion of information. The model allows us to yield a
number of insights into how homophily shapes optimal strategies of the monopolist and
influences a social welfare.
The two recent papers studying strategic diffusion of information that are most related to our research are Campbell (2009) and Goyal and Galeotti (2007). Campbell
(2009) studies the optimal pricing and advertisement strategies of a monopolist when consumers are engaged in WOM communication. Goyal and Galeotti (2007) study general
model of the strategic diffusion, where they distinguish between level of interaction and
content of interaction. In their paper, the level of interaction is characterized by a degree distribution, while content of interaction is a way in which actions of others affect
individual incentives. There are two key differences between these papers and our paper.
First, we extend existing models by relaxing the random matching assumption and study
how such intrinsic property of a network as who is connected to whom affects strategic
diffusion of information. Second, to our best knowledge, we are the first to consider the
6

The full title of the book: “Freakonomics: A Rogue Economist Explores the Hidden Side of Everything”.
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optimal design of the product in the presence of WOM communication.
The recent paper from the second stream of literature Golub and Jackson (2009) studies
how different mechanisms of communication operating through a network are affected by
homophily of the society. The principal difference of our paper is that in our setup the
monopolist (the sender of a message) takes an active role and influences WOM spreading
by choosing the design of the product.
Within a broader literature that considers epidemic diffusion (Newman, 2002; Sander
et al., 2002) our paper contributes to the analysis of multi-type networks with homophily
by extending the Newman’s generating functions approach. In particular, we consider the
case when node is operational (is able to transmit information further in the network)
with some probability, which depends on a type of the node.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a stylized model of
the strategic diffusion. In section 3 we derive the expected size of cascade of sales per
advertisement. Section 4 presents the main results on the optimal price and design of the
product and considers welfare implications of homophily. Section 5 examines the optimal
product design and advertisement strategy when the monopolist can target advertisement
by types of consumers. Section 6 considers robustness of the obtained results to a variation
in the shape of preference frontier. Section 7 studies the optimal strategy of the monopolist
that is interested only in one group of consumers. Section 8 considers the case of a global
cascade of sales. Finally, Section 9 outlines avenues for future research and concludes.

2

Model

In this section we formally present the model, which consists of three main blocks: network
structure, consumer preferences and monopolist problem.

2.1

Network Structure

There is a continuum of consumers of two types A and B, which are embedded into
undirected social network. Consumers of type A constitute measure γ of the population
and the rest are consumers of type B. We focus on the case with consumers of two types
because it provides basic intuitions and insights, while keeping an analysis transparent7 .
The network is represented by a random graph characterized by a degree distribution
p(k) and probabilities of ties among types of consumers (ρA , ρB ). The parameter ρi is the
probability that a randomly chosen link of a consumer of type i leads to a consumer of
the same type and with complementary probability to consumer of another type. Thus
links of a consumer can be partitioned into two sets: links to consumers of the same type
7

For example, the case of consumers of three types with the third type that is not interested in the
product is the same as the case of two types with a corrected degree.
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and links to consumers of another type. The probability that a consumer of type i with k
links has j ≤ k links to consumers of the same type is given by the binomial expression:

P r J = j|k, ρi =

k!
(ρi )j (1 − ρi )k−j
j!(k − j)!

(1)

The expected number of links connecting a type i consumer to consumers of the same
type is given by:

E J|k, ρi =


k
X


j × P r J = j|k, ρi = kρi
j=0

A randomly selected consumer of type A with probability p(k) has k links, k(1 − ρA )
of which connect her to consumers of type B. Taking the expectation we find that on
average consumer of type A has z1 (1 − ρA ) links to consumers of type B, where z1 is
expected number of first neighbors. Multiplying obtained expression by the measure of
consumers of type A in the population we obtain total number of links of type AB, which
is γz1 (1 − ρA ). By analogy a number of links of type BA is equal to (1 − γ)z1 (1 − ρB ).
Using the fact that the graph is undirected and number of links of type AB should be equal
to the number of links of type BA we arrive to the equality γ(1 − ρA ) = (1 − γ)(1 − ρB ).
Solving for ρB we obtain:
ρB = 1 −

γ
(1 − ρA )
1−γ

(2)

Therefore, without loss of generality, in the case of two types of consumers we have
just one parameter ρ = ρA that characterizes linking preferences of all consumers. The
parameter ρ represents a level of homophily of the society, since it specifies the probability
of friendship relationships among consumers of the same type, for both types.
It is important to underline that friendship relationships among consumers are formed
on the basis of many parameters such as geographical proximity, common interests and
so on. A network formation process itself is beyond a scope of this paper. In the analysis
we assume that the network of social contacts is exogenously given, and is the same for
all products in question. The spreading of WOM in the network for different types of
products varies due to differences in homophily level that the society exhibits towards
these products.
Figure 1 illustrates 3 different networks with the same degree distribution where all
nodes preserve the same connectivity. The only parameter that changes is the level of homophily of the society. As one can observe, depending on ρ networks range from perfectly
mixed to two separated graphs, where consumers of type A are completely disjoint from
consumers of type B.
To avoid an ambiguity we introduce some key definitions concerning a measurement
of homophily level. A benchmark case that we will use extensively is the case when links
6
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(a)

(b)

(c)

Figure 1: All three graphs have nodes with the same number of neighbors, however they
differ in the homophily level. In (a) consumers are linked only to consumers of another
type, ρ = 0; in (b) we have random mixing of consumers, ρ = 0.5; in (c) consumers exhibit
extreme homophily, ρ = 1.
among consumers are formed with the uniform probability independently of a type.
Definition 1. The friendship ties in the society are randomly matched if ρ = γ.
We can think about a network of detergent consumers as an example of a network with
random matching. A plausible assumption would be that preference towards a liquid or
powdered detergent is not important itself for forming ties among consumers and thus we
may think that consumers of detergent are matched randomly.
In the sociological literature, a tendency of friendship to be biased towards own type
beyond the relative proportion in the population is referred to as “inbreeding homophily”
(see, for example Coleman, 1958, Marsden, 1987 and McPherson et al., 2001). In this
case the proportion of links going to consumers of the same type is higher than otherwise
would be implied by random matching.
Definition 2. The society exhibits the inbreeding homophily if ρ > γ
There are also networks in which a situation can be reversed and social ties are biased
towards different-type relationships (e.g. network of sexual contacts).
Definition 3. The society exhibits a heterophily if ρ < γ
To illustrate ideas let us consider examples of random matching and network which
exhibits homophily. If consumers are matched randomly with a uniform probability then
consumer of type A has on average the proportion ρ = γ of neighbors of the same type.
At the same time the expression (2) implies that the average proportion of neighbors of
consumer of type B of the same type is ρB = (1 − γ), which equals to proportion of
consumers of type B in the population. In the case when consumers of type A are linked
more often among themselves as compared to the case of random matching, ρ > γ, by
expression (2) the same applies to the consumers of type B, since ρB > (1 − γ).
7
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2.2

Consumer Preferences

Consumers, in addition of having linking preferences, differ in two other respects. First,
across types consumers differ in preferences towards a product design. Consumers of type
A prefer one characteristic of the product, while consumers of type B are interested in the
opposite features. Second, within types consumers differ in a reservation price P̄j they are
willing to pay for the product and the minimal level of desirable characteristic w̄j , which
induces them to buy the product.
More formally, in the model two variables affect the decision of consumers: the price
P ∈ [0, 1] and characteristic of product w ∈ [0, 1]. For concreteness, a consumer j of type
A buys the product if characteristic is higher than the threshold level w ≥ w̄j and the
price is lower than the reservation price P ≤ P̄j . In contrast, a consumer l of type B buys
the product if w ≤ w̄l and P ≤ P̄l .
We assume that within a type the reservation price and characteristic threshold are
distributed according to f i (w̄, P̄ ) probability density function. Hence, a randomly chosen
consumer j of type A, which is aware of the product with a characteristic w and price P
buys it with the probability:
q A = P r(w ≥ w̄j ∩ P ≤ P̄j ) =

Z

w

0

Z

1

f A (w̄, P̄ )dw̄dP̄

P

And similarly a randomly selected consumer l of type B, which knows about the
product buys it with the probability:
q B = P r(w ≤ w̄l ∩ P ≤ P̄l ) =

Z

1Z 1

w

f B (w̄, P̄ )dw̄dP̄

P

To simplify the analysis for the major part of it we assume that the threshold characteristic and threshold price distributed independently and identically according to the
uniform distribution U [0, 1] for both types. This implies that f A (w̄, P̄ ) = f B (w̄, P̄ ) = 1
and probabilities to buy the product are given by the following expressions:
(
q A = (1 − P )w
q B = (1 − P )(1 − w)
For given price the system describes a preference frontier, depicted in Figure 2, which
encompasses all admissible pairs of probabilities for two types of consumers to buy the
product. By choosing the product design the monopolist identifies a probability pair
(q A , q B ) and fixes network of potential buyers. The network of potential buyers consists of
all consumers that would buy the product if they know about it. An increase in P shifts
frontier inwards, simultaneously decreasing probabilities to buy the product for two types.
In the paper we will encounter two special types of the product design.

8
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qB
B

1-P
A

B
B

A

A

P¯

A

A

B

B

P
B

0

1-P

B

B
A

B

qA

Figure 2: On the left hand side preferences frontier with characteristic of the product
being marked by circle. On the right hand side implied social network, with probability
to buy the product shown by intensity of the color.
Definition 4. The design is called symmetric if the product characteristic w is such that
two types of consumers acquire the product with identical probabilities, q A = q B .
In the case described above, the symmetric design is represented by w = 21 .
Definition 5. The design is called specialized if the product characteristic w ∈ {0, 1},
which implies that only one type of consumers acquires the product.
These two types of design represent different marketing strategies. A symmetric design
intends to satisfy needs of both types of consumers, without giving preference to any of
them, while the specialized one focuses on one type and neglects the other.

2.3

Monopoly Problem

The monopolist develops new product and introduces it to consumers who are engaged in
WOM communication. In the model the monopolist chooses design of the product w and
price P to maximize profits. To induce sales the monopolist advertises the product directly
to an infinitesimal part of the population. The rest of the population is expected to find
out about the product from neighbors who have acquired the product. The diffusion of
information stops when there are no new acquisitions of the product.
The network literature usually distinguish two possible scenarios of information spreading. In the first an information propagates to some finite number of consumers and than
stops, while in the second an information continues to propagate unboundedly. Let us
give the precise definition of the latter case:
Definition 6. We say that the global cascade of sales arises if ultimately some noninfinitesimal proportion of the population buys the product.

9
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Depending wether the global cascade of sales arises or not there are two techniques
available to study information diffusion. The main results of the paper are developed for
the case of finite sales, while in Section 8 we study the case of global cascade.

3

Cascade of Sales

In this section we derive the expression for the expected size of cascade of sales generated
by one advertisement and study its properties. In the derivation of the expression we rely
on the generating functions approach for multi-type nodes based on Newman (2003). The
main focus of Newman’s paper is heterogeneity of types in terms of degree distribution.
Our paper adopts different perspective. While two types of consumers enjoy the same
degree distribution, they differ in their willingness to purchase the product. This implies
that a further propagation of information depends on the way in which different types are
linked.

3.1

Generating Functions Approach

In the field of complex networks, generating functions were introduced by Newman et
al. (2001) and since then have been widely used. A generating function encapsulates
all the information about degree distribution, and thus completely characterizes a random
network. The generating functions allow us to calculate various local and global properties,
such as average degree, average size of component, etc.
In the case of nodes of two types we need to define generating functions associated with
degree distribution and homophily level of each type of consumer. Recall that probability
of having j links to consumers of the same type for a randomly selected consumer of type
i with k links is given by P r(J = j|k, ρi ), which is described in (1). The probability
pseudo-generating function F0i (x, y), where i ∈ {A, B}, is given by:
F0i (x, y) =

∞
X
k=0

p(k)q i

k
X

P r(J = j|k, ρi )xj y k−j

(3)

j=0

This is a polynomial expression in x and y where the coefficient on xj y k−j is the
probability that a randomly chosen consumer of type i buys the product, given that she
has j links to consumers of the same type and k − j links to consumers of another type.
These functions are known as pseudo-generating due to the fact that for x = y = 1
they do not sum to 1. This happens since not all consumers buy the product. Actually,
F0i (1, 1) = q i , which is the probability that a randomly chosen consumer of type i buys
the product given that she is aware of it.
Using the binomial identity we can perform summation over j and the expression
reduces to the following:

10
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F0i (x, y) =

∞
X

p(k)q i [ρi x + (1 − ρi )y]k

k=0

Note, when x = y, we obtain the same generating function as in the case when there
is only one type:
F0i (x, x)

=

∞
X

p(k)q i xk

k=0

This inheritance allows us to calculate a number of useful properties applying the same
techniques as in the case of nodes of one type. Taking the k-th derivative and normalizing
by the factor k!F0i (1, 1) one can recover degree distribution of consumers:
" 
#
∂ k i
1
= p(k)
F0 (x, x)
∂x
k!F0i (1, 1)
x=0

A moment of the degree distribution of order m can be calculated by deriving the
generating function m times and multiplying each time by x:
1
F0i (1, 1)




X
∂ m i
x
F0 (x, x)
=
k m p(k)
∂x
x=1
k

∂F i (1,1)

For example the average degree of consumer of type i is equal to q1i 0∂x .
Apart of the characteristics intrinsic to all random graphs we also can calculate properties tailored to a type of consumer. For example, a degree distribution of links connecting
the same type nodes for node of type i is given by:
" 
#
1
∂ k i
= P r(J = j|k, ρi ) × p(k)
F0 (x, 1)
∂x
k!F0i (1, 1)
x=0

A degree distribution of a neighbor of a randomly chosen consumer plays the important
role in the analysis to come. Note it is not the same as the degree distribution of a randomly
selected consumer, since the more links a consumer has the more often she is selected as
a neighbor. A consumer with k links is found k-times more often through friends than
a consumer with one link. Therefore, the probability to have a neighbor with k links is
proportional to kp(k). After normalization we obtain that the degree distribution of a
neighboring consumer ξ(k) is given by:
kp(k)
kp(k)
ξ(k) = P∞
=
jp(j)
z1
j=1
Using the degree distribution of neighboring consumer we can write a generating function characterizing degree distribution of a neighboring node of consumer of type i:

11
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F1i (x, y)

=

∞
X
k=0

1
ξ(k)q [ρ x + (1 − ρ )y] = [ρi x + (1 − ρi )y]
z1
i

i

i

k



∂F0i (x, y) ∂F0i (x, y)
+
∂x
∂y



The important characteristic that affects the process of information diffusion or spreading of a disease in the network is the excess degree of a neighboring node. That is to say
we want to find generating functions that characterize the probability that a neighboring
consumer of type i has k links apart of the link which led us to this consumer. The excess
degree distribution is given by:
ˆ = ξ(k + 1) = (k + 1)p(k + 1)
ξ(k)
z1
And the associated generating functions are:
F̂1i (x, y)

=

∞
X

i i
ˆ
ξ(k)q
[ρ x + (1 − ρi )y]k

k=0

∞
X

ξ(k)q i [ρi x + (1 − ρi )y]k−1
k=1

1 ∂F0i (x, y) ∂F0i (x, y)
=
+
z1
∂x
∂y
The generating function characterizing the degree distribution of second neighbors who
buy the product is given by:
=

∞
X

p(k)q i [ρi F̂1i (x, y) + (1 − ρi )F̂1∼i (x, y)]k = F0i (F̂1i (x, y), F̂1∼i (x, y)),

k=0

where ∼ i denotes the type of consumer different from type i.
Using this expression we can calculate z2 , the expected number of second neighbors of
a randomly selected node. Since we are interested in the expected number of neighbors
regardless of type we put y = x. To account for all neighbors in the following calculation
we assume the probability to buy product for two types q A and q B equal to 1. This implies
that F̂1i (x, y) = F̂1∼i (x, y), since now there is no difference between consumers of two types.
Applying the method described above we arrive to the expression8 :
h
i
1
∂
z2 = F i (1,1)
× x ∂x
F0i (F̂1i (x, x))
0
x=1,q i =1
∞
i (1,1)
P
∂
F̂
=
kp(k)[F̂1i (1, 1)]k−1 × 1∂x
=

k=0
∞
P

=

k=0
∞
P

kp(k)

∞
P

ξ(n)(n − 1)

n=1

n(n − 1)p(n)

n=1
8

In the case when q i = 1 for i ∈ {A, B} all generating functions evaluated at 1 are equal to 1.
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In the following analysis we assume that the underlying conditions are such that no
giant component of consumers who buy the product arises. The case of giant cascade
of sales is considered in Section 8. Let us denote by H1i (x, y) generating functions characterizing probability distribution of size of finite components of buyers, induced by an
information flow through a randomly chosen link to a consumer of type i. If the consumer
of type i does not buy the product component is empty (since the information does not
spread any further). This happens with the probability:
1−

∞
X

ξ(k)q i = 1 − F̂1i [1, 1], i ∈ {A, B}

k=1

However, with complementary probability a consumer with k contacts buys the product and relays the information to neighbors. The further spread of information is subject to
analogous considerations for k−1 additional links and is described by F̂1i [H1i (x, y), H1∼i (x, y)].
This leads us to the following system of self-consistency conditions for H1i (x, y):
(
H1A (x, y) = 1 − F̂1A [1, 1] + xF̂1A [H1A (x, y), H1B (x, y)]
H1B (x, y) = 1 − F̂1B [1, 1] + y F̂1B [H1A (x, y), H1B (x, y)]
where the leading factor x and y account for the fact that the first visited consumer
buys the product.
On the basis of H1i (x, y) we can define H0i (x, y) generating functions of size of buyers
components generated by advertisement to a randomly chosen consumer of type i. Since
a randomly chosen consumer of type i does not buy the product with the probability
1 − F0i (1, 1) we have:
(
H0A (x, y) = 1 − F0A (1, 1) + xF0A [H1A (x, y), H1B (x, y)]
H0B (x, y) = 1 − F0B (1, 1) + yF0B [H1A (x, y), H1B (x, y)]
As we have shown before the derivative of the generating function evaluated at the point
(1, 1) gives us the first moment of a distribution. That is why the number of consumers
who eventually buy the product if we advertise it to a randomly chosen consumer of type
i + H i evaluated at the point (1, 1). Recall that in the population there
i is the sum H0x
0y
is proportion γ of consumers of type A and 1 − γ of type B. Thus if we advertise the
product to a randomly chosen consumer the expected number of purchases in vector form
is given by the expression:
 A
A
H0x + H0y
s(q , q , ρ, γ, z1 , z2 ) = (γ 1 − γ)
B + HB
H0x
0y
A

B

Omitting further derivations to the appendix, the resulting expression is given by the
following lemma:
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Lemma 1. The expected number of consumers who buy the product if the monopolist
advertises it to a randomly chosen consumer is given by an expression:
h
i q A 
,
s(q A , q B , ρ, γ, z1 , z2 ) = (γ 1 − γ) I + F00 (I − F̂01 )−1
qB
where z1 and z2 are expected numbers of first and second neighbors correspondingly,
z2
γ
ρA = ρ, ρB = 1 − 1−γ
(1 − ρ), F̂00 = z12 F̂01 and
F̂01

z2
=
z1

q A ρA
q A (1 − ρA )
B
B
q (1 − ρ )
q B ρB

!

Proof See appendix 
A
The first term of the expression (γ 1 − γ)I qqB is the probability that a randomly
chosen consumer buys the product and transmits information further. The second term
consists of two parts. The first part (γ 1 − γ)F00 is a vector with components showing the
number of the first neighbors of type A and type B who buy the product. The second
A
part is the vector (I − F̂01 )−1 qqB with components that represent number of purchases
generated by the flow of information through a randomly chosen link to a consumer of
type A and B.
Note that as in the epidemic diffusion literature only first two moments of degree distribution z1 and z2 are relevant for the propagation of cascade of sales. This substantially
reduces the amount of information about network structure that monopolist needs to know
to make the optimal decision.
In a special case when consumers of both types have the same preferences towards the
product and buy it with the same probability q the expression of cascade of sales reduces
to well known expression of the average size of component of operational nodes9 :

s(q A , q B , ρ, γ, z1 , z2 )|qA =qB =q = q +

q 2 z1
1 − q(z2 /z1 )

In this case size of sales cascade is independent of such network characteristics as
population composition γ and homophily level ρ. This points out that for homophily to
have the impact on diffusion there should be a heterogeneity of types in terms of preferences
towards both the product and friendship relationships.

4

Main Results

We begin our analysis by establishing a condition under which the global cascade of sales
arises. With this condition in mind, we turn to the problem of the monopolist considering
9

See Callaway et al. (2000)
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the case when sales are finite. We derive the optimal price and product design solving the
maximization problem in two steps. In the first step we fix the price and solve the problem
for the optimal design of the product. In the second step we allow the monopolist to reoptimize with respect to the price. We complete our analysis by studying the implications
of homophily level for price elasticity of demand and social welfare.

4.1

Arise of the Global Cascade of Sales

A WOM marketing campaign is regarded as successful if it induces multiple sales per
advertisement. However, there are some exceptional cases when an information propagates to a significant part of the population. These were the case of movie advertisement
“The Blair Witch Project” and diffusion of Hotmail accounts. In this section we identify
the condition under which the monopolist acting optimally can sell the product to noninfinitesimal part of the population. We consider two cases, when the price is endogenous
and forms part of the decision process of the monopolist and when price is exogenous.
From Lemma 1 we know that number of buyers of the product explodes when the
denominator det(I− F̂01 ) goes to 0. Thus the condition of appearance of the global cascade
of sales is:
1 − qAqB



z2
z1

2

(1 − ρA − ρB ) −

z2 A A
(q ρ + q B ρB ) ≤ 0
z1

In order not to favor any group of consumers in the following analysis we assume
that consumers are partitioned into two groups of equal sizes, thus consumers of type
A and B constitute half of the population. In this case the expression (2) implies that
ρA = ρB = ρ. Substituting expressions for q A and q B and incorporating assumptions we
obtain the following quadratic inequality:

2

w (1 − P )

2



z2
z1

2
(1 − 2ρ) − w(1 − P )

2



z2
z1

2
(1 − 2ρ) + 1 − (1 − P )

z2
ρ≤0
z1

In the expression, degree distribution is summarized by the ratio of expected number
of second neighbors to expected number of first neighbors. This ratio tells us how efficient
is a network in information diffusion. In particular, it shows how many second neighbors
on average become aware of the product if a consumer shares the information with one of
her first neighbor.
The following proposition summarizes the result:

Proposition 1. For endogenous price P , if z2 /z1 ≥ min 2, ρ−1 there exists non empty
set E(z2 /z1 , ρ) such that for any (w, P ) ∈ E(z2 /z1 , ρ) a global cascade of sales arises.
Proof See appendix 
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In the framework of one-type nodes a paper by Molloy and Reed (1995) for the first
time derives the condition for appearance of the giant component of connected nodes,
which is z2 /z1 > 1. In our case it is a necessary condition for a global cascade of sales to
occur. One can easily check that z2 /z1 < 1 does not satisfy condition in Proposition 1,
since ρ ∈ [0, 1]. Intuitively, for the information to spread unboundedly, there should exist
a giant component of connected consumers upon which spreading may take place.
The condition in Proposition 1 is stronger than z2 /z1 > 1 since not all consumers
buy the product and consequently relay WOM further. One can separate the condition
into two parts: z2 /z1 ≥ 2 and z2 /z1 ≥ ρ−1 . The first part of the condition tells us that
independently of homophily level ρ, if z2 /z1 is higher than 2 then a global cascade of sales
occurs. This part of the condition comes from the case when maximal spread of WOM is

attained for symmetric characteristic w = 21 , which mitigates differences between nodes
and makes ρ irrelevant. Moreover, it resembles a condition from Callaway et al. (2000)
for the appearance of a giant component of operational nodes, z2 /z1 ≥ p1 , where p is a
probability that a node is operational. In our model in the case of the symmetric design
p = w = 12 , since all consumers buy the product with the same probability.
The second part of the condition comes from the case when ρ > 12 and the maximal
spread of WOM is attained when the monopolist chooses a specialized design (w ∈ {0, 1}).
In this case information propagates only via consumers of one type. To fix ideas assume
that the monopolist chooses w = 1 and thus only consumers of type A buy the product.
The expected number of first neighbors of type A is ρz1 and the expected number of
second neighbors of type A, which can be attained through type A consumers is ρ2 z2 .
Substituting these numbers into the condition from Molloy and Reed (1995) we obtain
z2 /z1 > ρ−1 , which is exactly the same as the second part of the condition in Proposition
1.
In the analysis to come we also consider a case when the price is exogenously given
and the monopolist only chooses characteristic of the product w. The following lemma
establishes condition for the global cascade of sales to occur for exogenously given price:

1
Lemma 2. For an exogenously given price P , if z2 /z1 ≥ 1−P
min 2, ρ−1 there exists
non-empty interval [w, w], such that for any w ∈ [w, w] a global cascade of sales arises.
Proof See appendix 
Not surprisingly, in the case of exogenous price the condition of appearance of giant
cascade of sales in the Lemma 2 is more strict, since not all consumers are willing to pay
the price P for the product.

4.2

Optimal Design

In this section we consider the problem of the monopolist who takes the price as given and
chooses the design of product to maximize profits. Without loss of generality we assume
16
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that a production cost of the product is zero. Thus profits are given by the product of the
price and size of sales cascade. In the case of an exogenously given price Lemma 2 implies

1
that there is no global cascade if z2 /z1 ≤ 1−P
min 2, ρ−1 . Thus the monopolist profits
maximization problem subject to preferences frontier is the following:
1
max P × s(q A , q B , ρ, , z1 , z2 )
w
2
s.t.: q A = (1 − P )w
q B = (1 − P )(1 − w)
Before going to the results we develop some intuition. We already have seen the
importance of homophily level in the Lemma 2 . In the following exercise let us assume
that the society exhibits heterophily, which implies that nodes of type A are more often
connected to nodes of type B. Assume further that a consumer of type A has bought
the product. Since majority of her neighbors are of type B, a necessary condition for
further spread of the information is attractiveness of the product to consumers of type
B. However, once they buy the product, most of their neighbors are of type A and the
process reiterates. Thus we can conclude that for a sufficiently low homophily level the
optimal product design should be appealing to both groups of consumers. Assume now
that homophily is sufficiently high and consumers of both types have majority of their
links to the consumers of the same type. Would it be optimal to focus on consumers of
one type, and forget about others? The question is non-trivial, since there are components
of consumers of both types and if the monopolist focuses on one type all components of
another type will be out of reach.
The following proposition summarizes the results:
Proposition 2. For any exogenously given price P following holds:
(a) if ρ = 21 the function s(·) is horizontal line and all w ∈ [0, 1] are solutions to the
maximization problem.
(b) if ρ < 21 the function s(·) is quasi-concave and has its unique maximum at the point
w = 12 .
(c) if ρ > 12 the function s(·) is quasi-convex and its unique minimum is at the point
w = 12 and maxima are situated at points w ∈ {0, 1}
Proof See appendix 
The first result states that for two groups of consumers of equal sizes if ρ = 12 (which
for γ = 12 implies random mixing) the size of sales cascade is not affected by the product
characteristic w. That is why heterogeneity of consumers preferences towards the product
and towards linking both constitute key ingredients of the model.
17
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The Proposition 2 confirms our intuition for the case of low homophily levels and most
importantly states that the maximization problem has a threshold solution. More precisely, independently of a degree distribution and price, if ρ becomes higher than 21 , the optimal product design abruptly changes from symmetric w∗ = 12 to specialized w∗ ∈ {0, 1}.
The explanation is the following: when ρ is higher than 12 the majority of consumer’s
neighbors are of the same type as the consumer. That is why the design most attractive
for a randomly selected consumer is the one that induces the highest sales of the product
among her neighbors. The situation reiterates for every consumer that buys the product,
reinforcing the optimality of the specialized design.
The obtained result does not depend on a degree distribution or price, which makes it
easy to apply. The monopolist just needs to know whether homophily level of the society
is higher or lower than 21 to choose the optimal design of the product.

4.3

Demand

Incorporating the optimal design of the product into the expression for cascade of sales
from Lemma 1 we obtain the following demand function:



z1 (1−P )
1−P

ρ ≤ 21
1
+
 2
2−z2 /z1 (1−P ) ,

Q(P, ρ, z1 , z2 ) =
)

1 + 1 −zz1 (1−P
, ρ > 21
 1−P
2
/z (1−P )
ρ

2

1

Note that for ρ ≤ 12 the demand is independent of homophily level ρ, since in this
case the optimal design is given by the symmetric characteristic w∗ = 12 . The symmetric
design implies that both types of consumers buy the product with the same probability and
mixing pattern does not matter. The following proposition summarizes main properties
of the demand function:
Proposition 3. The demand is given by the function Q(P, ρ, z1 , z2 ), which has following
properties:
(i) Q(P, ρ, z1 , z2 ) is continuous in ρ and for ρ >

1
2

is increasing and convex in ρ.

(ii) Q(P, ρ, z1 , z2 ) is decreasing and convex in P .
(iii) A price elasticity of demand is increasing in ρ, for ρ > 21 .
Proof See appendix 
The first result states that for homophily level ρ > 12 a classical demand (the demand
with the incorporated optimal design) increases in ρ. In Proposition 2 we have seen that
for ρ > 21 the optimal design is specialized with characteristic w∗ belonging to the set
{0, 1}. In this case a randomly chosen consumer has the majority of neighbors of the same
type and a further increase of homophily increases this subset. To fix ideas assume that
18
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w∗ = 1 and P = 0. Thus if a consumer of type A gets the information about the product
she and all her neighbors of type A acquire the product. Thus an increase in homophily
level leads to a higher number of acquisitions in the neighborhood of a type A consumer.
The obtained result differs from intuitions of McPherson (2001), which argues that
for higher homophily levels, information flows are localized and status quo of individuals
tend to be maintained. We show that when further transmission of information depends
on the adoption decision, an increase in homophily may actually produce higher spread
of information. Higher levels of homophily induce a higher correlation of consumers’
preferences making it easier for the monopolist to design a product information of which
can penetrate further in the network.
The convexity part of the result (i) comes from the fact that an increase of homophily
expands a subset of neighbors of the same type in a neighborhood of consumer. Moreover,
each consequent increase of homophily operates upon the neighborhood of a higher number
of consumers, which acquire the product. This gives rise to increasing returns in terms of
number of buyers in homophily level.
The result (ii) has a similar nature as the result of convexity of demand in ρ. A
price increase affects the decision of all consumers to acquire the product regardless of
their position in a chain of buyers. Let us consider an example when a consumer who is
situated earlier in a chain of buyers stops to acquire the product due to a price increase. In
this case the whole branch of consumers that has received information about the product
through this consumer stops to acquire the product. A further price increase has smaller
impact on the demand, since chains of buyers become shorter.
Having two previous results at hand we are equipped to understand the third one. The
result (i) implies that when ρ > 21 an increase in ρ leads to higher sales and awareness
of consumers about the product. Hence, a price increase affects decision of an increased
number of consumers, which translates into an increased price elasticity of demand.

4.4

Optimal Price

We have seen the solution of maximization problem with respect to the optimal design
of the product. In this subsection we relax the assumption of exogenous price and allow
the monopolist to re-optimize with respect to a price. The optimal product design is
independent of the price chosen by the monopolist, thus all results derived in the previous
sections hold for the optimal price as well. The monopolist maximizes profits and solves
the following problem with respect to price:
!
1−P
z1 (1 − P )
max P ×
1 + 1 z2
0≤P ≤1
2
ρ − z1 (1 − P )
In a price setting the monopolist faces usual trade-off: an increase in the price augments profits from each unit sold, but simultaneously decreases demand for the product.
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However, in the presence of WOM communication there is an additional informational
component of the trade-off. Since a consumer spreads information about the product only
if she acquires it, a price increase lowers product awareness of consumers. The properties
of the optimal pricing strategy are summarized in the following proposition:
Proposition 4. The optimal price P ∗ for ρ ≥ 12 is decreasing in the homophily level,
while for ρ < 21 , P ∗ is independent of the homophily level. The optimal price P ∗ is always
lower than 12 .
Proof See appendix 
The result is a direct consequence of the fact that the price elasticity of demand is
increasing in homophily level. As we have seen in Proposition 3 for ρ > 12 an increase
in homophily implies that more consumers become aware about the product, and sales
increase. The monopolist by reducing the price capture a higher fraction of informed
consumers. Proposition 4 implies that the informational component outweighs an increase
of profits per purchase generated by a higher price.

4.5

Social Welfare

Our model allows to address welfare implications of the homophily in explicit manner.
A majority of the literature on homophily adopts a view that diversity of contacts is a
socially desirable property per se (e.g. Moody, 2001). Although this assertion could be
supported by evidence, no rigorous analysis has been made. A recent paper by Currarini et
al. (2009) shows that welfare implications of homophily crucially depend on the structure
of consumers preferences. In the following analysis we consider welfare implications of
homophily in the framework of our model.
A consumer surplus is given by the following expression:
∗

Z

CS(P (ρ), ρ, z1 , z2 ) =

1

P ∗ (ρ)

Q(P, ρ, z1 , z2 )dP

We already have seen that for ρ ≥ 21 , demand is increasing in homophily, and thus
increase in ρ shifts the demand curve upwards. This happens, since more consumers
become aware about the product. At the same time an increase in the homophily level by
Proposition 4 leads to lower price. As a consequence more consumers buy the product for
lower price and thus both effects lead to an increase in consumer surplus.
A producer surplus is the area below the price of the product and marginal cost curve
(M C) of producer. In our case M C = 0, which leads to the following expression for the
producer surplus:
P S(P ∗ (ρ), ρ, z1 , z2 ) = P ∗ (ρ) × Q(P ∗ (ρ), ρ, z1 , z2 )
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Proposition 5. Both consumer surplus and monopolistic profits are increasing in the level
of homophily.
The Proposition 5 states that if information retransmission is subject to an adoption
decision then society is better-off when homophily level is high. There are two driving forces of the result. First, the optimally constructed message propagates better in
homogenous groups, which leads to an increase in awareness of consumers about the product. Second, the price reduction is more effective in facilitating diffusion of WOM in the
case of higher homophily levels. These two effects are beneficial for both consumers and
the monopolist.

4.6

Example of Classical Random Graph

In further analysis we will often refer to a special case of network structure known as
a classical random graph. The notion of a random graph has been introduced by Paul
Erdõs and Alfréd Rényi and since then it is the most studied model of graphs. Nodes
connectivity in a random graph follows Poisson degree distribution and arises in infinite
networks, where each node creates a link to any other node in the network with a uniform
probability.
In our case probability that a randomly selected link connects two consumers of the
same type is different from the probability that it connects consumers of different types.
One can think about a network of N consumers of two types, where each consumer creates
1
a link to any other consumer of the same type with probability ρz
N and to a consumer
1
of another type with the probability (1−ρ)z
. When N goes to infinity we obtain infinite
N
network that is characterized by two Poisson degree distributions. One for links among
consumers of the same type with the mean ρz1 and another for links among consumers of
different types with the mean (1 − ρ)z1 . Recall, that the sum of two Poisson variables also
follows Poisson distribution with the mean equal to the sum of means. That is why overall
connectivity of a randomly chosen node follows Poisson distribution and the network is
classical random graph with average connectivity given by z1 .
In the case of Poisson degree distribution the average connectivity z1 is a sufficient
characteristic of the network, and z2 = z12 . This property allows us to study the effect of
network density on the propagation of WOM and the optimal strategies of the monopolist.
As we already have seen the optimal design of the product does not depend on a
degree distribution and is given by the expression in Proposition 2. Incorporating relation
between the expected number of first and second neighbors into the demand function we
obtain:



z1 (1−P )

1
+
ρ ≤ 12
 1−P
2 
2−z1 (1−P ) ,
Q(P, ρ, z1 , z2 ) =
z1 (1−P )

1 + 1 −z
, ρ > 12
 1−P
2
(1−P )
ρ

1
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Note that demand is continuous and does not depend on ρ when ρ ≤ 12 . In the
derivation we use the demand function for the case of ρ > 21 . In order to get results for
the case of ρ ≤ 21 one needs to substitute ρ = 21 . Taking derivative with respect to z1 of
the demand function one can show that the denser is the network the higher is demand:
(1 − P )2 ρ
∂
Q(P, ρ, z1 , z2 ) =
>0
∂z1
2(1 − (1 − P )z1 ρ)2
Solving maximization problem we obtain the expression for the optimal price,10 , 11
which is given by:

√
 1 − 2− 4−2z1 , ρ ≤ 1
z1
2
√
P∗ =
 1 − 1− 1−z1 ρ , ρ > 1
z1 ρ
2
The derivative of the optimal price with respect to homophily level ρ is negative, the
thus optimal price is decreasing with homophily of the society:
√
∂P ∗
2 − z1 ρ − 2 1 − z1 ρ
√
<0
=−
∂ρ
2z1 ρ2 1 − z1 ρ
To study an effect of the network density on the optimal price we derive the expression
(4.6) with respect to z1 :
√
∂P ∗
2 − z1 ρ − 2 1 − z1 ρ
√
<0
=−
∂z1
2z12 ρ 1 − z1 ρ
The derivative is negative, which implies that the optimal price P ∗ is decreasing in
both average connectivity and homophily parameter ρ.
Turning to welfare implications of homophily and using the same line of arguments as
we have outlined before one can show that an increase in z1 leads to a higher consumer
surplus. This happens since a denser network implies higher awareness of consumers about
the product. An increase in the network density also augments benefits for the monopolist
of price reduction. These both effects benefit consumers.

5

Targeted Advertisement

In the previous section we have considered the problem of the monopolist, which cannot
distinguish consumers by type. The monopolist, restricted by the anonymity assumption,
was advertising the product to a randomly chosen subset of the population. This formulation is relevant for an advertisement through the mass media, when the monopolist
10

In the case of Poisson degree distribution the first order condition for the optimal price when ρ > 12
reduces to z1 ρP 2 + 2P (1 − z1 ρ) + z1 ρ − 1 = 0.
11
Condition of absence of a global cascade of sales in the case of the Poisson distribution is z1 <
min{2, ρ−1 }.
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cannot control who is watching or hearing an advertisement. However, in the case of a
direct advertisement there is a possibility to target chosen group of consumers. For example, monopolist that is interested in students’ community, can advertise a product in a
university campus, etc.
In this section we are going to relax anonymity assumption and allow the monopolist
to observe types of consumers. More precisely, we assume that the monopolist chooses a
design of the product w and proportion α of consumers of type A in the subset that is
selected for advertisement. Note, before proportion of consumers of type A which were
receiving advertisement was fixed exogenously at the level γ, which is proportion of nodes
of type A in the society. In the analytical part, for tractability of the problem, we assume
that the price P is exogenously given. Thus the maximization problem of the monopolist
becomes:
max P × s(q A , q B , ρ, α, z1 , z2 )
w,α

s.t.: q A = (1 − P )w
q B = (1 − P )(1 − w)
The expression for sales cascade s(q A , q B , ρ, α, z1 , z2 ) can be rewritten as a linear combination of number of purchases resulted from an advertisement to consumer of type A
and of type B: α × sA (q A , q B , ρ, z1 , z2 ) + (1 − α) × sB (q A , q B , ρ, z1 , z2 ). Given the linear
structure of the problem in terms of α it is easy to see that if q A 6= q B the optimal targeting proportion has a corner solution. Namely, the solution depends whether a cascade
of sales induced by an advertisement is higher if we advertise to a consumer of type A or
of type B. In the case when q A = q B both types of consumers buy the product with the
same probability and thus all values of α on the interval [0, 1] are optimal.
Proposition 6. Targeting one type of consumers for advertisement is always the optimal
strategy for the monopolist.
Since preference frontier is symmetric, without loss of generality we assume that the
monopolist targets consumers of type A and hence α∗ = 1. Moreover, by symmetric nature
of the problem if α∗ = 1 and some w∗ is the solution then α∗ = 0 and 1 − w∗ is a solution
too. For the following analysis we assume that α∗ = 1.
The maximization problem with targeted advertisement for an arbitrary degree distribution quickly becomes intractable. In the following analysis we focus on the commonly
employed structure of a network given by the classical random graph.
The intuition tells us that possibility of targeting of consumers for advertisement would
unavoidably brings bias towards characteristics of the product favorable for consumers of
targeted type. The bias itself can be of two forms. The first form is that a threshold level
of homophily, which separates specialized design (w ∈ {0, 1}) and symmetric (w = 12 )
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moves to a level lower than 12 . The second form is that for ρ lower than new threshold

level the optimal design belongs to the interval 21 , 1 instead of being symmetric. The
following proposition shows that the both types of bias are present in the case of targeted
advertisement:
Proposition 7. In the case of the Poisson degree √distribution and exogenously given
1− 9−2z1 (1−P )+(1−P )2 z12
, such that for
price, there is a threshold level ρ̂T (z1 , P ) = 34 +
4(1−P )z1
ρ ≥ ρ̂T (z1 , P ) the monopolist will advertise and specialize only on one type of consumers
(α∗ = 1 and w∗ = 1). For ρ < ρ̂T (z1 , P ) the optimal advertisement strategy is still α∗ = 1,
but the optimal characteristic is given by the following expression:

∗

w =ρ−

1 − 2ρ −

p
(1 − ρ)(1 − 2ρ)(1 − (1 − P )z1 ρ)[2 + (1 − P )z1 (1 − 2ρ)]
1
>
(1 − P )z1 (1 − 2ρ)
2

Proof See appendix 
The success of WOM campaign to a high extend depends on the effectiveness of the
direct advertisement in inducing initial acquisitions of the product. In order to convert
consumers of type A, who receive direct advertisement, into initial adopters the monopolist
designs the product more attractive to them. The bias in the product design persists even
when the society exhibits heterophily (ρ < 21 ).
In the case of the Poisson distribution the rise in z1 implies a higher diffusion of WOM
in the network, since there are more channels for information to spread on. In the case
when we approach the global cascade phase (z1 goes to 2(1 − P )−1 ) the threshold level
ρ̂T (z1 , P ) goes to 21 and the optimal characteristic for ρ < 21 is w∗ = 12 . Thus the optimal
design becomes exactly the same as in the case of non-targeted advertisement. In this
case the monopolist optimally sacrifices some initial adopters, and design the product in
a way that WOM can penetrate further in the network.
The result implies that when we approach the global cascade phase the option to target
advertisement to some group of consumers does not influence neither the optimal design
of the product nor the demand. We regard this result as indication of robustness of the
optimal design strategy that we obtained in our base-line model.

6

Non-Linear Shape of the Preference Frontier

The previous analysis develops results for the case of a linear preference frontier. However,
one can think about many examples where a relationship between acquisition probabilities
for two groups of consumer is not linear. These situations occur when attractiveness of the
product for two types of consumers varies non-linearly in a characteristic. For example,
longer guarantee on the product is attractive for both types, while red color of the product
24
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may be very welcome by one group of consumers and be unattractive for an another. In
this situations the shape of the frontier can vary from concave to convex depending on a
product in question.
In this section we want to address the robustness of obtained results to a change in
curvature of the preference frontier that the monopolist faces. We consider CES functional
form of the preference frontier, which allows to model variety of shapes. Thus probabilities
to buy the product for two types of consumers are related in the following manner:
qA

r

+ qB

r

= (1 − P )r

By varying the parameter r we can obtain shapes of the preferences frontier that
include a bend inward circle (r = 0.562), a linear function (r = 1), a bend outward circle
(r = 2) and everything in between.

6.1

Arise of the Global Cascade of Sales

Similarly to analysis in the case of a linear frontier it is important to establish conditions
under which a global cascade of sales occurs. An essential parameter for appearance of
the global cascade of sales is r, the degree of curvature. For example, if r goes to ∞, as
we know from properties of CES function, the frontier becomes a step function and the
best design of the product is w = 1 which implies q A = q B = 1 − P . In this case two
types of consumers are fully satisfied with a product design and thus effectively there is
only one type of consumers. The condition for appearance of global cascade in this case
1
is well known from the networks literature, namely zz21 ≥ 1−P
.
For arbitrary values of r the condition of existence of a global cascade is given by the
following inequality:

2

r

1 − (1 − P ) w(1 − w )

1
r



z2
z1

2

z

1
2
(1 − 2ρ) − (1 − P ) w + (1 − wr ) r
ρ≤0
z1

Due to an arbitrary power of the polynomial equation it is impossible to solve it
analytically, however we can identify a broad set of parameters such that a global cascade
of sales occurs. The results are summarized in the following proposition:
Proposition 8. In the case of CES preference frontier with a curvature parameter r,
1
global cascade of sales arises if z2 /z1 > 2 r or ρ > ρ̂N L (z2 /z1 , r, P ), where
1

ρ̂N L (z2 /z1 , r, P ) = min

0≤w≤1

1−w(z2 /z1 )2 (1−P )2 (1−wr ) r

.
1
(1−P )(z2 /z1 ) w+(1−wr ) r (1−2w(z2 /z1 )(1−P ))

Proof See appendix 
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6.2

Problem of the Monopolist

The subsection consists of two parts: analytical and numerical. In the analytical part we
focus on the case of an exogenous price and Poisson degree distribution and find conditions
such that symmetric and specialized designs are solutions to the maximization problem.
In the second part we endogenize a price and solve monopolist problem numerically for
an arbitrary degree distribution.
Similarly to the analysis in Section 5 we assume that the degree distribution is Poisson
and price is given exogenously. The monopolist faces a non-linear preferences frontier and
chooses design of the product to maximize profits. The monopolist solves the following
maximization problem:
1
max P × s(q A , q B , ρ, , z1 , z2 )
w
2
s.t.: q A = (1 − P )w
1
q B = (1 − P )(1 − wr ) r
We identify homophily level such that symmetric and specialized designs are solutions.
The results are summarized by the following proposition:
Proposition 9. For an exogenous price and Poisson degree distribution following holds:
1

r −2
(a) For r ≤ 1 there is ρ̂N L (r, P, z1 ) = 12 − 2z21 (1−P
) such that the optimal design is sym1

metric w∗ = 21 r if ρ < ρ̂N L (r, P, z1 ) and otherwise the optimal design is specialized
w∗ ∈ {0, 1}.

1
(b) For r > 1 the optimal design is symmetric w∗ = 12 r if ρ < ρ̂N L (r, P, z1 ) otherwise
 1 
1 r
the optimal design belongs to the interval
,1 .
2
Proof See appendix 
The Proposition 9 states that the optimal design has similar structure as in the case
of linear preferences frontier. More precisely, for bend inwards frontier (r ≤ 1) only
symmetric and specialized designs are optimal. They are separated by new threshold
value ρ̂N L (r, P, z1 ). For bend outwards frontier (r > 1) and sufficiently low levels of ρ,
symmetric design is optimal. However for high levels of ρ the solution gradually changes
from the symmetric to specialized.
In the case of bend outward shape of the frontier (r > 1) the optimal design is biased
towards the symmetric design. The explanation is following: while the corner solutions
are still as attractive as they were in the problem with r = 1 (endpoints are fixed), the
symmetric solution becomes more appealing. This happens since in the case of r > 1
by moving to the center of symmetry from q A = 1 we are gaining more of q B , while
26
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Figure 3: Diagram depicts a solution for the case of scale free distribution with pdf
Ck −3.34 , where C is normalizing constant. In this case z1 = 1.23 and z2 = 1.77. Areas
represent: symmetric solution (blue), asymmetric (light yellow), specialized (yellow) and
area where a global cascade arises (red).
sacrificing the same amount of q A as compared to the linear case. For the case when r < 1
the situation is reversed.
The threshold level of homophily ρ̂N L (r, P, z1 ) is increasing in z1 . Thus the denser
is a network the more appealing becomes the symmetric design. The intuition is the
same as for the case of targeted advertisement. Dense network implies higher diffusion of
information and to penetrate further the product should be appealing for both types.
To check robustness of the obtained result we consider a numerical solution of the
problem for the case of a scale free distribution. Figure 3 shows a diagram of the structure
of the solution. One can see from the diagram that for r < 1 we have similar results as
in a linear case. Namely, there is the threshold level of ρ̂N L (r, z1 , z2 , P ) such that for ρ <
ρ̂N L (r, z1 , z2 , P ) the optimal solution is symmetric and for values of ρ > ρ̂N L (r, z1 , z2 , P )
the solution is specialized. In the case of r > 1 a structure stays the same but after
ρ = ρ̂N L (r, z1 , z2 , P ) the solutiongradually
changes from symmetric to some intermediate
1 
1 r
value, which lies in the interval 2 , 1 .

7

Targeting One Type of Consumers

In this section we address the problem of monopolist who has an interest only in one type
of consumers, for concreteness lets assume that this is type B. This situation could arise
if the monopolist believes that consumers differ in their post purchasing behavior. For
example, once a consumer of type B buys the product she becomes a customer loyal to
the brand and continue to make purchases of the same brand, while consumers of type
27
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Figure 4: The optimal design when z1 = 1.7, z2 = 2. Figure (a) for the case of γ = 12 ,
figure (b) for the case of γ = 0.8
A may be accidental buyers. For the sake of simplicity we assume that the monopolist
completely ignores consumers of type A. Assume further that the monopolist maximizes
awareness of the brand and chooses price equal to 0. The main question is than: what is
the optimal product design such that maximizes a number of purchases by consumers of
type B?
The first guess could be that the monopolist should completely forget about consumers
of type A and design a product as attractive as possible to consumers of type B. The first
guess, however, turns out to be wrong for broad set of parameters. Assume for example
that homophily level of the society is low, which implies that consumers of type B are
mostly connected to consumers of type A. Hence, to spread, the information should be
able to pass through consumers of type A. A Figure 4a illustrates the optimal product
design for the case of groups of consumers of equal size (γ = 12 ) and z1 = 1.7 and z2 = 2.
Note that for ρ ∈ [0, 0.39] the optimal design is such that there is a non zero probability
for consumers of type A to buy the product. The result requires low levels of homophily
and actually implies heterophily of the society. We already have seen similar answer in
the case when the monopolist profits from both types of consumers.
Probably, the more surprising result is that although society exhibits homophily it may
be optimal to make a product attractive for consumers of type A. The only requirement
is that the proportion of consumers of type A in the society should be sufficiently high.
A Figure 4b illustrates the optimal product design for the case when consumers of type
A constitute 80% of the population (γ = 0.8) and the expected number of neighbors are
as before z1 = 1.7 and z2 = 2. Note that ρ ∈ [0.8, 1] implies that the society exhibits homophily and there is a range of ρ ∈ [0.8, 0.81] such that the optimal product characteristic
w is not zero. Another surprising feature of the result is that for a sufficiently small ρ it
is optimal to construct the product more attractive to consumers of type A than B.
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8

Global Cascade Phase

In previous sections we have seen what happens when WOM marketing campaign does
not trigger a global cascade of sales. This is the case for a majority of WOM campaigns.
However, WOM campaigns such as diffusion of Hotmail accounts and “The Blair Witch
Project” (tiny budget movie) were so successful that a considerable fraction of the population became aware of the product. In this cases we can no longer apply techniques from
the previous analysis.
So let us assume that conditions are such that a global cascade of sales arises, by
1
Lemma 2 this happens when zz12 > 1−P
min{2, ρ−1 }. To determine the fraction of the
population that buys the product we turn back to generating functions. However instead
of looking on the distribution of sizes of cascades we would like to estimate a fractional
size of a global cascade. Assume that by following randomly chosen link we arrive to a
consumer of type i. Lets denote by ui the probability that this consumer does not buy
the product. This happens if a consumer does not like the product or price, which occurs
with the probability 1 − qi or if she likes it, but has not heard about it. We can write the
system of self-consistency conditions for ui as the following:
uA = 1 − q A + qA
uB

= 1−

qB

+

qB

∞
P


k−1
ξ(k) ρA uA + (1 − ρA )uB

k=1
∞
P


k−1
ξ(k) ρB uB + (1 − ρB )uA

k=1

In terms of generating functions system is:
uA = 1 − F̂1A (1, 1) + F̂1A (uA , uB )
uB = 1 − F̂1B (1, 1) + F̂1B (uA , uB )
Having at hand uA and uB we can find probabilities that a randomly chosen consumer
of type i does not form a part of a global cascade. These probabilities are different from uA
and uB , due to the difference of degree distributions of a randomly selected and neighboring
node. Note that the probability that a randomly chosen consumer does not have links to
a giant component of buyers is equal to F0i (uA , uB ). Thus a randomly selected consumer
does not buy the product with the probabilities:
v A = 1 − F0A (1, 1) + F0A (uA , uB )
v B = 1 − F0B (1, 1) + F0B (uA , uB )
Calculating the linear combination with weights equal to proportions of consumer of
type A and B in the society and subtracting from 1 we obtain the probability that a
randomly selected consumer belongs to a giant component:

s = 1 − γv A − (1 − γ)v B = γF0A (1, 1) + (1 − γ)F0B (1, 1) − γF0A (uA , uB ) − (1 − γ)F0B (uA , uB ),
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where
uA = 1 − F̂1A (1, 1) + F̂1A (uA , uB )
uB = 1 − F̂1B (1, 1) + F̂1B (uA , uB )
γ(1 − ρA ) = (1 − γ)(1 − ρB )
Note that the last expression insures that a number of links going from consumers of
type A to consumers of type B equals to the number of links going from consumers of
type B to consumers of type A. Since we choose γ, ρA and ρB exogenously we can assume
that the condition holds.
As in the previous analysis we assume that there are equal proportions of consumers
of type A and type B in the population (γ = 12 ). This in turn implies that ρA = ρB = ρ
and the maximization problem of monopolist is summarized by the following lemma:
Lemma 3. For two groups of equal sizes the maximization problem of monopolist becomes:
max

q A ,q B


1 A
q [1 − G0 (x)] + q B [1 − G0 (y)]
2

s.t.: x = 1 − ρq A [1 − Ĝ1 (x)] − (1 − ρ)q B [1 − Ĝ1 (y)]
y = 1 − (1 − ρ)q A [1 − Ĝ1 (x)] − ρq B [1 − Ĝ1 (y)]
0 ≤ q A , q B , x, y ≤ 1
where x = ρA uA + (1 − ρA )uB is the probability that a randomly chosen link of a
consumer of type A leads to a giant component of buyers and y = ρB uB + (1 − ρB )uA
P
k
is the same for consumers of type B. In addition G0 (x) = ∞
k=0 p(k)x and Ĝ1 (x) =
P∞
k−1 . Proof See appendix 
k=0 ξ(k)x
Assuming a linear preferences frontier, q A = (1 − P )w and q B = (1 − P )(1 − w) the
maximization problem becomes:
1−P
[1 − wG0 (x) − (1 − w)G0 (y)]
w
2


s.t.: x = 1 − (1 − P ) ρw[1 − Ĝ1 (x)] + (1 − ρ)(1 − w)[1 − Ĝ1 (y)]


y = 1 − (1 − P ) (1 − ρ)w[1 − Ĝ1 (x)] + ρ(1 − w)[1 − Ĝ1 (y)]
max

0 ≤ w, x, y ≤ 1
A solution to the maximization problem is characterized by the following proposition:
Proposition 10. In the case when population is divided into two equally sized groups,
γ = 12 , for any degree distribution following hold:
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• For ρ < 21 , w =

1
2

is a local maximum, which gives higher profits than w ∈ {0, 1}.

• For ρ > 12 , w = {0, 1} are local maxima, which give higher profits than w = 21 .
• For ρ = 12 , the interval [0, 1] is the solution to the problem.
The Proposition 10 indicates that the optimal design of the product has the same
structural form as in the case where there is no global cascade of sales.

9

Conclusion

The importance of a word of mouth communication for a company’s performance is well
documented by a growing number of research. However, success of a WOM marketing
campaign varies enormously between product categories and within. We show that a high
variation in the performance of WOM campaigns can be explained by different homophily
levels of a consumer network towards different products.
A key innovation of our paper is two-fold. First, we enrich a network structure by
incorporating notion of homophily and study its impact on the optimal strategies of the
monopolist. Second, the monopolist is allowed to construct a message to the network
by choosing the design of product. We found a number of results: (i) for low levels
of homophily the product, designed to attract both types of consumers is preferred to
specialized products, even if there is no cost of producing more than one product; (ii) a
price elasticity of demand is higher for products towards, which consumer network exhibits
higher levels of homophily; (iii) a social welfare is increasing in homophily level; and (iv) a
product designed to attract two types of consumers may be optimal even if the monopolist
benefits only from one type.
Flexibility of the model allows us to outline several avenues for future research. The
first one consists in introduction of influencers, consumers whose opinion affect opinion of
many others. In the extension we want to match two observations: influencers on average
enjoy higher average degree and their proportion in the population is small. The extension
aimed to study the impact of homophily on information spreading in a network of “huband-spoke” type and the effect of presence of hubs on the optimal design of the product
and price. In the case when society exhibits homophily influencers will be linked among
themselves and will constitute core with access to a large share of consumers.
In the second extension we want to consider the optimal strategy for an entrant who
faces presence of an incumbent firm on a market. We assume that a product is durable
and consumer buys it only once. Hence, the optimal strategies for the monopolist that we
have studied in the paper are optimal for incumbent firm as well. We want to study how
homophily affects the optimal product design for the entrant and its effect on a variety of
products that are produced. Finally, we plan to compare predictions of the model with
observations from real markets.
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10

APPENDIX

Proof of Lemma 1
Let us find first what is the number of consumers of type A that buy the product if
we advertise it to consumer of type A. The answer is:
∂ A
H (x, y)
∂x 0

A
= H0x
(1, 1)
x=1,y=1

With abuse of notation we assume that all function are being evaluated at point (1, 1):
A
A A
A B
H0x
= F0A + F0x
H1x + F0y
H1x
i by solving linear system of self-consistency conditions:
We can find H1x
(
A = F̂ A + F̂ A H A + F̂ A H B
H1x
1
1x 1x
1y 1x
B = F̂ B H A + F̂ B H B
H1x
1x 1x
1y 1x

In vector form:
A
A
1 − F̂1x
−F̂1y
B
B
−F̂1x
1 − F̂1y

!
 A
A
H1x
F̂1
=
B
0
H1x

or in more compact way


where F̂1i =

∞
P
k=1

F̂01

=

I−

F̂01

 H A 
1x
B
H1x

 A
F̂1
=
,
0

ξ(k)qki and
!
∞
A F̂ A
X
F̂1x
1y
=
ξ(k)(k − 1)
B F̂ B
F̂1x
1y
k=1

qkA ρA
qkA (1 − ρA )
qkB (1 − ρB )
qkB ρB

!

The number of consumers of type A who buy the product if consumer of type i finds
i goes to infinity when determinant of
out about the product from one of her friends H1x
the matrix I − F̂01 goes to zero:
!
A
A
1 − F̂1x
−F̂1y
∆ = det
B
B
−F̂1x
1 − F̂1y
The system has following solution:
 A
 A
H1x
0 −1 F̂1
=
(I
−
F̂
)
1
B
0
H1x
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Thus we can find the number of consumers of type A who buy the product if consumer
of type A receives direct advertisement:
A
H0x

=

F0A

+

A
(F0x



A
F0y
)

A
H1x
B
H1x


=

F0A

+

A
(F0x

A
F0y
)(I

−

F̂01 )−1

F̂1A
0



0
F̂1B





By doing analogous calculations we can get:
 A
 A
H1x
B
B
0 −1 F̂1
B
B
B
)
=
(F
F
)(I
−
F̂
H0x
= (F0x
F0y
)
0x 0y
1
B
0
H1x
A
A
A
H0y
= (F0x
F0y
)

B
B
B
H0y
= F0B + (F0x
F0y
)

 A
H1y

A
A
= (F0x
F0y
)(I − F̂01 )−1

B
H1y
 A
H1y



0
F̂1B



B
B
= F0B + (F0x
F0y
)(I − F̂01 )−1

B
H1y



The total number of purchases resulted from direct advertisement to a consumer of
type A is following:

A
A
A
A
H0x
+ H0y
= F0A + (F0x
F0y
)(I − F̂01 )−1

=

F0A

A
(F0x

+



F̂1A
0

A
F0y
)(I

−



A
A
+ (F0x
F0y
)(I − F̂01 )−1

F̂01 )−1



F̂1A
F̂1B



0
F̂1B


=



If the monopolist advertises the product to consumer of type B:
B
H0x

+

B
H0y

=

F0B

+

B
(F0x

B
F0y
)(I

−

F̂01 )−1

F̂1A
F̂1B





Let us define:
F00

=

A FA
F0x
0y
B FB
F0x
0y

!
=

∞
X

kp(k)

k=1

qkA ρA
qkA (1 − ρA )
qkB (1 − ρB )
qkB ρB

!

The resulting number of purchases resulting from advertisement to consumers of type
A and B in vector form is:

s=

A + HA
H0x
0y
B + HB
H0x
0y



F0A
F0B


=


+

F00 (I

−

F̂01 )−1

F̂1A
F̂1B





Thus the number of purchases resulting from advertisement to a randomly drawn
consumer is:
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"
s = (γ 1 − γ)s = (γ 1 − γ)

F0A
F0B


+

F00 (I

−

F̂01 )−1

F̂1A
F̂1B



#

Assuming that the probability to purchase the product does not depend on the number
of neighbors that consumer has, namely qkA = q A and qkB = q B we obtain:
h
i q A 
s = (γ 1 − γ)s = (γ 1 − γ) I + F00 (I − F̂01 )−1
qB
Note that expression depends on the linear combination of probability to infect initial

−1 A 
A
q
node (γ 1 − γ) qqB and (γ 1 − γ) I − F̂01
which is number of infected nodes if we
qB
follow randomly chosen link, with weight given buy

z12
z2 .

Proof of Proposition 1
The global cascade of sales arises when inequality holds:
2

w (1 − P )

2



z2
z1

2
(1 − 2ρ) − w(1 − P )

2



z2
z1

2
(1 − 2ρ) + 1 − (1 − P )

z2
ρ≤0
z1

We want to identify a condition such that there exists characteristic of the product w
which satisfies the inequality and hence the global cascade of sales may arise. To this end
we find the minimum of the expression and check when it is less than zero. A derivative
of the expression with respect to w is −(1 − P )2 (z2 /z1 )2 (1 − 2ρ)(1 − 2w). Note that if
ρ < 21 coefficient of the term w2 is positive and thus we have upward sloping parabola.
In this case function has its minimum at the point w = 21 . Substituting to the expression
and taking positive root we obtain a condition z2 /z1 > 2(1 − P )−1 . On the other hand,
if ρ > 12 we have downward parabola with maximum at w = 12 and minima on the ends
z1
of the interval [0, 1], which implies that we have cascade if ρ > z2 (1−P
) . Combining both
z2
1
−1
parts we arrive to the following condition: z1 > (1−P ) min{2, ρ }.
Note that the condition on network structure becomes less restrictive when price decreases. Thus if price is a part of decision process the monopolist can achieve highest
diffusion when P = 0 and condition becomes zz12 > min{2, ρ−1 }.
Proof of Proposition 2
Substituting constraints to the objective function and deriving with respect to w we
find:
(1 − P )2

z14 (1 − 2w)(1 − 2ρ)(2z1 + z2 (1 − P )(1 − 2ρ))
2(z12 − z1 z2 ρ(1 − P ) − wz22 (1 − P )2 (1 − w)(1 − 2ρ))2
36
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A denominator of the condition is always positive and thus sign depends on the numerator. Recall that we assume that we are in sub-critical phase with zz21 < 2(1 − P )−1
and thus term 2z1 + z2 (1 − P )(1 − 2ρ) is always positive. The sign of the condition depends exclusively on values of ρ and w. Namely if ρ < 12 derivative is positive for w < 12
and negative afterwards. Thus, we can conclude that for ρ < 12 objective function has
unique maximum at the point w = 12 . In the case when ρ > 21 results are reversed and the
objective function has its minimum at a point w = 21 and maxima lie on the boundaries,
namely w∗ ∈ {0, 1}. If ρ = 12 all interval [0, 1] satisfies first order condition.
Proof of Proposition 3
We analyze the second part of the functional form of demand. Results for the first
part can be obtained by substituting ρ = 12 . The demand is decreasing and convex in P :
∂
1
Q(P, ρ, z1 , z2 ) = −
∂P
2
The second derivative:



(1 − P )z12 ρ(2z1 − z2 (1 − P )ρ)
1+
<0
(z1 − (1 − P )z2 ρ)2

∂2
z14 ρ
Q(P,
ρ,
z
,
z
)
=
>0
1
2
∂P 2
(z1 − (1 − P )z2 ρ)3
It is positive since by condition of no global cascade from Lemma 2 we know that
z1 > (1 − P )z2 ρ. Moreover cross derivative of Q(P, ρ, z1 , z2 ) with respect to P and ρ is
(1−P )z 4
− (z1 −(1−P )z12 ρ)3 , which is negative.
Lets turn to the elasticity of demand:
∂P log Q(P, ρ, z1 , z2 )
∂P log P



P
1
1
1 + z1
−
1−P
z1 − (1 − P )z2 ρ z1 + (1 − P )(z12 − z2)ρ

Ed = −
=

Taking derivative of Ed with respect to ρ we obtain:
∂
z13 z2 P (1 − P )2 (z12 − z2)ρ2 + z15 P
Ed =
>0
∂ρ
(z1 − (1 − P )z2 ρ)2 (z1 − (1 − P )z2 ρ + z12 ρ(1 − P ))2
Which implies that elasticity of demand is increasing in ρ.
∂ ∗
(1 − P )2 z13
s (P, ρ, z1 , z2 ) =
>0
∂ρ
2(z1 − (1 − P )z2 ρ)2
Thus for ρ >

1
2

function is increasing in ρ.
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Proof of Proposition 4
Price is decreasing in the homophily level
The first order condition for P is:
(1 − 2P )z12 − (1 − P )z1 [(1 − P )z2 + (1 − 3P )(z2 − z12 )]ρ
−
2(z1 − (1 − P )z2 ρ)2
−

(1 − P )2 (1 − 2P )(z12 − z2 )z2 ρ2
2(z1 − (1 − P )z2 ρ)2

=0

Let us fixing expected number of friends z1 and z2 and call expression on the left hand
side F (P, ρ). The second derivative of F (P, ρ) with respect to P is:
FP00 (P, ρ) =

3z14 ρ(z1 − z2 ρ)
>0
(z1 − (1 − P )z2 ρ)4

It is positive since by conditions of no giant component we have z1 > z2 ρ. Thus function
z +z 2 ρ−z ρ
is convex. Evaluating function on the ends of the interval we have F (0, ρ) = 12(z11−z2 ρ)2 > 0
and F (1, ρ) = − 21 . The first derivative with respect to P is negative at 0:
FP0 (0, ρ) = −1 −

z12 ρ(2z1 − z2 ρ)
<0
(z1 − z2 ρ)2

If F (P, ρ) is convex in P , positive at 0 and negative at 1, we can conclude that function
should intersect x-axis from above on the interval [0, 1]. Hence, the derivative of the F (P, ρ)
∂
evaluated for the optimal price P = P ∗ is negative, ∂P
F (P ∗ , ρ) < 0.
Moreover F ( 12 , ρ) =
than

1
2.

z13 ρ
2(2z1 −z2 ρ)2

> 0, which implies that the optimal price is always less

The derivative with respect to ρ is:


(1 − P )z13 (1 − P )2 z2 ρ − (1 − 3P )z1
0
Fρ (P, ρ) = −
2(z1 − (1 − P )z2 ρ)3

The sign of the derivative depends on the sign of the term in square brackets. The
3z1
derivative is negative if P > 1 − 2z
. By the condition of no giant component we know
2ρ
that zz21 < ρ1 and thus 1 − zz21ρ is negative. Since price is positive we can safely conclude
3z1
that P > 1 − zz21ρ > 1 − 2z
. This implies that derivative of the expression is negative.
2ρ
By implicit function theorem we know:
∂P ∗
=−
∂ρ

∂
∂ρ F (P, ρ)
∂
∂P F (P, ρ) P =P ∗

Taking into account that FP0 (P ∗ , ρ) < 0 and Fρ0 (P ∗ , ρ) < 0 we can conclude that
is negative and consequently the optimal price P ∗ is decreasing in ρ.

∂P ∗
∂ρ

Profits are increasing in the level of homophily
38
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Lets take two levels of homophily ρ2 > ρ1 . By the Proposition 3 we know that for any
fixed price P following holds Q(P, ρ2 , z1 , z2 ) > Q(P, ρ1 , z1 , z2 ). Thus for any given price P
the same is true for profits, namely P Q(P, ρ2 , z1 , z2 ) > P Q(P, ρ1 , z1 , z2 ). Assume further
that P1∗ is optimal price for ρ1 . The previous result states that π(ρ2 , P1∗ ) > π(ρ1 , P1∗ ) and
thus by optimality we know that π(ρ2 , P2∗ ) > π(ρ2 , P1∗ ) > π(ρ1 , P1∗ ), where P2∗ is optimal
price for ρ2 .

Proof of Proposition 7
A derivative of sales function with respect to product characteristic is given by:
s0 (w) = (1 − P )×
×

1 + z1 (1 − P )(1 − 3ρ − (1 − 2ρ)[w2 (1 − P )z1 + 2w(1 − ρ(1 − P )z1 ) + ρ(1 − P )z1 ])
(1 − wz12 (1 − P )2 (1 − 2ρ)(1 − w) − z1 ρ(1 − P ))2

Note that the denominator is always positive. It is easy to verify that for ρ > 12 all
terms in the numerator involving w are positive too. Thus if we prove that s0 (0) > 0 then
the derivative of sales function with respect to w is positive on the whole interval [0, 1] and
we can conclude that the optimal design is w∗ = 1. Substituting w = 0 into the derivative
1
and taking into account that z1 < ρ(1−P
) we have:
s0 (0) =

1 + (1 − P )z1 (1 − 2ρ)
(1 − P )z1 (1 − ρ)
=1+
>0
1 − (1 − P )z1 ρ
1 − (1 − P )z1 ρ

Thus for ρ > 12 characteristic w∗ = 1 is the solution to the problem.
When ρ < 21 then all terms involving w are negative and numerator is decreasing
function in w. Thus numerator has its minimum at w = 1 and condition for s0 (w) > 0 on
the interval w ∈ [0, 1] is simply s0 (1) > 0. This in turn implies that if w∗ = 1 is maximum
it is also the global maximum. The derivative at 1 is greater than zero if:

−2(1 − P )2 z12 ρ2 + z1 (1 − P + 3(1 − P )2 z1 )ρ + 1 − (1 − P )z1 − (1 − P )2 z12 > 0
An expression on the left describes downward sloping parabola. The solution is:
p
9 − 2z1 (1 − P ) + (1 − P )2 z12
4(1 − P )z1
p
3 1 + 9 − 2z1 (1 − P ) + (1 − P )2 z12
ρ2 = +
4
4(1 − P )z1

3 1−
ρ1 = +
4

It can be shown that ρ2 > 1 and thus condition reduces to:
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3 1−
+
4

p
9 − 2z1 (1 − P ) + (1 − P )2 z12
1
<ρ<
4(1 − P )z1
2

Combining the previous condition with the case of ρ >
solution if:
3 1−
ρ > ρ̂T (z1 , P ) = +
4

we know that w∗ = 1 is

1
2,

p
9 − 2z1 (1 − P ) + (1 − P )2 z12
4(1 − P )z1

On the other hand for ρ < ρ̂T (z1 , P ) there is an interior solution which is given by:

w∗ = ρ −

1 − 2ρ −

p
(1 − ρ)(1 − 2ρ)(1 − (1 − P )z1 ρ)[2 + (1 − P )z1 (1 − 2ρ)]
(1 − P )z1 (1 − 2ρ)

It is interesting to note that w = 12 is never solution for ρ <
4(1−P )
1
∗
(2−(1−P )z1 )(2+(1−P )z1 (1−2ρ)) > 0, which implies that w > 2 .

1
2

since s0 ( 12 ) =

Proof of Proposition 8
Lets denote by θ =

z2
z1

and by λ(w) the following polynom:



1
1
λ(w) = 1 − (1 − P )2 w(1 − wr ) r θ2 (1 − 2ρ) − (1 − P ) w + (1 − wr ) r θρ
The global cascade of sales occurs if there is w̄ such that λ(w̄) ≤ 0. One can readily
obtain condition for ρ. We just need to take the derivative with respect to ρ and to show
that it is negative. Thus there is the global cascade of sales if ρ > ρ̂(θ, r), where
1

1 − wθ2 (1 − P )2 (1 − wr ) r


ρ̂(θ, r) = min
1
0≤w≤1
(1 − P )θ w + (1 − wr ) r (1 − 2wθ(1 − P ))
From the previous analysis we know that candidates for maxima are extreme values
1
and such that q A = q B , which in our case is 12 r . Evaluating polynomial at 0 we have
1
λ(0) = 1 − (1 − P )θρ and at the point 12 r we have:
 1
h 1
i
1
1
λ 2− r = 4− r (2 r − (1 − P )θ) 2 r + (1 − P )θ(1 − 2ρ)
From the first condition we can conclude that if ρ >
1
r

1
θ

then there is global cascade.

From the second we see that if θ > 2 (1 − P )−1 and ρ < ρ̂ =
1
r

1
2

1

+

2r
2θ(1−P )

cascade of sales arises. Lets consider a case when θ > 2 (1 − P )−1 , but ρ <

then global
1
2

1

+

2r
2θ(1−P ) .
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From the first condition we know that there is global cascade if ρ >
existence of the global cascade we should prove that

1
2

+

1
2r

2θ(1−P )

>

1
θ(1−P )

thus to insure

1
θ(1−P ) .

1−r
1
(1 − P ) + 2 r θ−1 > θ−1
2



1−r
1
(1 − P ) > θ−1 1 − 2 r
2


1
θ > (1 − P )−1 2 − 2 r
 r−1

1
θ > 2 r (1 − P )−1 2 r − 1
There is the global cascade if the former condition holds. However, we
assumed
 have

r−1
1
that θ > 2 r (1 − P )−1 , which implies that former condition holds, since 2 r − 1 < 1.
1

Thus we have shown that if θ > 2 r there is global cascade independently of the homophily
level ρ.

Proof of Proposition 9
For the case of Poisson degree distribution size of sales cascade is given by:
1

s(w, P, r, z1 ) =

(1 − P )(w + (1 − wr ) r (1 + 2wz1 (1 − P )(1 − 2ρ)))
1

2(1 − (1 − P )z1 (wρ + (1 − wr ) r (ρ + wz1 (1 − P )(1 − 2ρ))))

The product characteristic w∗ = 0 is global maximum if for any w, s(0) ≥ s(w):
1

1−P
(1 − P )(w + (1 − wr ) r (1 + 2wz1 (1 − P )(1 − 2ρ)))
≥
1
2(1 − z1 ρ(1 − P ))
2(1 − (1 − P )z1 (wρ + (1 − wr ) r (ρ + wz1 (1 − P )(1 − 2ρ))))
since 1 − P ≥ 0 by definition, we have
1

1
(w + (1 − wr ) r (1 + 2wz1 (1 − P )(1 − 2ρ)))
−
≥0
2(1 − z1 ρ(1 − P )) 2(1 − (1 − P )z1 (wρ + (1 − wr ) r1 (ρ + wz1 (1 − P )(1 − 2ρ))))
Note further that denominators of two fractions are positive due to condition of no
global cascade, thus the sign of the expression depends on the numerator of combined
terms, which is:
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1

1

−4(1 − P )2 w(1 − wr ) r z12 ρ2 + 4(1 − P )w(1 − wr ) r z1 (1 + (1 − P )z1 )ρ+
1

+1 − w − (1 − wr ) r (1 + (1 − P )wz1 (2 + (1 − P )z1 )) ≥ 0
Note that expression describes downward sloping parabola and thus our condition will
be in the form ρ1 ≤ ρ ≤ ρ2 , where ρ1 and ρ2 are solutions to the quadratic equation:
v

u
1
r
u
r
1 1
1
1
t (1 − w)(1 − (1 − w ) ) 
ρ1 = + 
−
1
2 2 z1 (1 − P ) z1 (1 − P )
w(1 − wr ) r
v


u
1
r
u
1
1 1
1
t (1 − w)(1 − (1 − w ) r ) 
+
ρ2 = + 
1
2 2 z1 (1 − P ) z1 (1 − P )
w(1 − wr ) r


The condition should hold for all w and thus we should find the maximum of ρ1 and
the minimum of ρ2 . In order to do this we should identify maximum and minimum of the
term with w. Taking derivative of this term with respect to w we have:
h

i
1+r
− 1+r
r
r+1
r
r
r
r
(1 − 2w ) + w
− (1 − w )
(1 − w )
−
2
w
1
Independently of r one can see that first derivative is zero at the point w = 12 r . It


1
1+r
can be proved that for r < 1, − (1 − 2wr )− wr+1 − (1 − wr ) r is negative for w < 21 r
1
and positive afterwards, which implies that minimum is at w = 12 r and maxima lay at
borders.
Substituting back values of w into condition for ρ we obtain:
1

1

1
2r − 2
1
2r
−
<ρ< +
2 2z1 (1 − P )
2 2z1 (1 − P )
1

Since z1 ≤ 2 r the minimum of last term is 1. Taking it into account we can rewrite
the condition as:
1

1
2r − 2
−
<ρ<1
2 2z1 (1 − P )
On the other hand for r > 1, one can show that w∗ = 0 is never a solution. Lets
evaluate derivative of sales at w = 0 for the case when r > 1 we have:
∂s
∂w

=
w=0

(1 − P )(1 + (1 − P )z1 (1 − 2ρ))2
>0
2(1 − (1 − P )z1 ρ])2
42
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It is always positive which implies that w∗ = 0 is never solution for r > 1.
 1 
1
The symmetric design w = 12 r is global maximum if for any w, s 12 r ≥ s(w):
1

1−P
1

2 r − (1 − P )z1

≥

(1 − P )(w + (1 − wr ) r (1 + 2wz1 (1 − P )(1 − 2ρ)))
1

2(1 − (1 − P )z1 (wρ + (1 − wr ) r (ρ + wz1 (1 − P )(1 − 2ρ))))

The denominators are positive due to no global cascade condition and thus sign of the
expression depends on the numerator of combined fraction, which is:
−2(1 − P )(w + (1 − 2

1+r
r

w)(1 − wr ) r )z1 ρ + 2 − (2 − 2wr ) r +

1+r
r

w)(1 − wr ) r z1 − w(2 r − (1 − P )z1 ) ≥ 0

+(1 − P )(1 − 2

1

1

1

1

r+1

1

Note that the line is downwards sloping if for any w, (w + (1 − 2 r w)(1 − wr ) r ) > 0.
Thus to prove that it has downward slope we should prove that the minimum of the term
r+1
1
w + (1 − 2 r w)(1 − wr ) r is greater or equal to 0. The first derivative is:
1

1−2

1+r
r

(1 − 2wr )(1 − wr )

1−r
r

−

(1 − wr ) r
w

!1−r
(4)

1
1
It is zero at point w = 21 r . For r < 1 the expression is negative for w < 21 r , since
1+r
1−r
1−r
term 2 r (1 − 2wr )(1 − wr ) r > 0 and term w−(1−r) (1 − wr ) r > 1 (by properties of
1

1+r
1−r
frontier). The expression is positive for w > 21 r , because term 2 r (1−2wr )(1−wr ) r <
1
1−r
0 and term w−(1−r) (1−wr ) r < 1. This implies that minimum lies at the point w = 21 r
where the expression equals to zero. Thus the line has negative slope. And condition
becomes:
(
!)
1
1
1
2 r (w + (1 − wr ) r ) − 2
ρ < ρ̂1 = min
1−
r+1
1
w
2
z1 (1 − P )(w + (1 − 2 r w)(1 − wr ) r )
we can show that for r < 1 the expression with w has its maxima on the borders and
thus, evaluating at w = 0 we have:
1

1
2r − 2
ρ< −
2 2z1 (1 − P )
The case when r > 1
Lets rewrite the expression (4):
1 − (2

1+r
r

(1 − 2wr ) + wr−1 )(1 − wr )

1−r
r
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1
1
1−r
r−1
It is zero at point w = 12 r . For r > 1 and w ≤ 12 r , min{(1 − wr ) r } = 2 r
1−r
1+r
and min{(2 r (1 − 2wr ) + wr−1 )} = 2 r . Thus minimum of the product of two terms
1
1
is equal to 1 and this implies that for w ≤ 12 r expression is negative. For w > 12 r ,
1−r
r−1
1+r
1−r
max{(1 − wr ) r } = 2 r and max{(2 r (1 − 2wr ) + wr−1 )} = 2 r , which implies that
1
expression is positive. Thus minimum of the expression is at the point w = 12 r line has
negative slope.
This leads us again to the condition:
(
!)
1
1
1
2 r (w + (1 − wr ) r ) − 2
ρ < ρ̂2 = min
1−
r+1
1
w
2
z1 (1 − P )(w + (1 − 2 r w)(1 − wr ) r )
Thus we can establish that there is ρ̂2 such that if ρ < ρ̂2 than the optimal characteristic
1
is w = 21 r . Note that condition ρ̂1 6= ρ̂2 since we optimize for different values of r. If
1
ρ > ρ̂2 then solution belongs to ( 21 r , 1), since as we have seen w = 1 is always not
optimal for the case of r > 1.

Proof of Lemma 3
Let us denote by x = ρuA + (1 − ρ)uB and by y = ρuB + (1 − ρ)uA than we can rewrite
system of equations as following:
s = γq A + (1 − γ)q B − γq A G0 [x] − (1 − γ)q B G0 [y]
uA = 1 − q A + q A Ĝ1 [x]
uB = 1 − q B + q B Ĝ1 [y]
Or equivalently:
s = γq A + (1 − γ)q B − γq A G0 [x] − (1 − γ)q B G0 [y]
x = ρ[(1 − q A ) + q A Ĝ1 (x)] + (1 − ρ)[(1 − q B ) + q B Ĝ1 (y)]
y = ρ[(1 − q B ) + q B Ĝ1 (y)] + (1 − ρ)[(1 − q A ) + q A Ĝ1 (x)]
Substituting γ =

1
2

we obtain following maximization problem of the monopolist:
max

q A ,q B


1 A
q + q B − q A G0 (x) − q B G0 (y)
2

s.t.
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x = 1 − ρq A − (1 − ρ)q B + ρq A Ĝ1 (x) + (1 − ρ)q B Ĝ1 (y)
y = 1 − (1 − ρ)q A − ρq B + (1 − ρ)q A Ĝ1 (x) + ρq B Ĝ1 (y)

Proof of Proposition 10
The FOC of the monopolist problem is:
∂y
∂x
+ G0 (y) − (1 − w)G00 (y)
=0
∂w
∂w
The derivatives of constraints with respect to w are following:
−G0 (x) − wG00 (x)

∂x
∂y
∂x
= 1 − 2ρ + ρĜ1 (x) + ρwĜ01 (x)
− (1 − ρ)Ĝ1 (y) + (1 − ρ)(1 − w)Ĝ01 (y)
∂w
∂w
∂w

∂y
∂x
∂y
= −1 + 2ρ + (1 − ρ)Ĝ1 (x) + (1 − ρ)wĜ01 (x)
− ρĜ1 (y) + ρ(1 − w)Ĝ01 (y)
∂w
∂w
∂w
The case when firm’s action has no effect.
Interesting case arises when ρ = 12 . It seems that w has no effect on the size of global
cascade of sales . Substituting ρ = 12 we can rewrite the problem as following:
max 1 − wG0 (x) − (1 − w)G0 (y)
w

s.t.
x = 12 + 21 wĜ1 (x) + 12 (1 − w)Ĝ1 (y)
y = 12 + 21 wĜ1 (x) + 12 (1 − w)Ĝ1 (y)
0 ≤ w ≤ 1, 0 ≤ x ≤ 1, 0 ≤ y ≤ 1
Note that in this case x = y for any w. This implies that maximization problem of the
monopolist in the case of ρ = 21 does not depend on w:
max 1 − G0 (x)
w

s.t.
x = 12 + 12 Ĝ1 (x)
0≤x≤1
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Thus eventual outbreak is the same for all values of w and moreover it’s size is equal
to the giant component of connected consumers.
The case when specialized design is optimal.
We want to check when it is optimal to focus on the first group or equivalently when
w = 1 is the solution. Note that w = 1 is corner solution that is why it is enough to show
∂s
that derivative of ∂w
is non-negative:
w=1
−G0 (x) − G00 (x)

∂x
+ G0 (y) > 0
∂w

s.t.
x = 1 − ρ + ρĜ1 (x)
y = ρ + (1 − ρ)Ĝ1 (x)
The derivative of first constraint with respect to w is:
∂x
∂x
= 1 − 2ρ + ρĜ1 (x) + ρĜ01 (x)
− (1 − ρ)Ĝ1 (y)
∂w
∂w
Thus we have
∂x
1 − 2ρ + ρĜ1 (x) − (1 − ρ)Ĝ1 (y)
=
∂w
1 − ρĜ01 (x)
Substituting it to the maximization problem we obtain:
G0 (y) − G0 (x) − G00 (x)

1 − 2ρ + ρĜ1 (x) − (1 − ρ)Ĝ1 (y)
1 − ρĜ01 (x)

>0

s.t.
x = 1 − ρ + ρĜ1 (x)
y = ρ + (1 − ρ)Ĝ1 (x)
Let us rewrite the first equation as:
[G0 (y) − G0 (x)] + G00 (x)

ρ(1 − Ĝ1 (x)) − (1 − ρ)[1 − Ĝ1 (y)]
1 − ρĜ01 (x)

≥0

The first term is non-negative when y ≥ x and the condition is following:
ρ + (1 − ρ)Ĝ1 (x) ≥ 1 − ρ + ρĜ1 (x)
(2ρ − 1)[1 − Ĝ1 (x)] ≥ 0
since Ĝ1 (x) ≤ 1 for all x ∈ [0, 1] the condition is ρ ≥ 21 .
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The same happens with the second term when ρ > 21 . Note that ρ > 12 implies that
Ĝ1 [x] < Ĝ1 [y] consequently 1 − Ĝ1 [x] > 1 − Ĝ1 [y]. Multiplying both sides by ρ and taking
into account that ρ ≥ 1 − ρ for ρ ≥ 12 we have:
ρ[1 − Ĝ1 (x)] ≥ ρ[1 − Ĝ1 (y)] ≥ (1 − ρ)[1 − Ĝ1 (y)]
Thus we have proved that w = 1 is locally optimal if ρ >
distribution.

1
2

independently of degree

The case when symmetric design is optimal
The symmetric design w = 12 is optimal if following holds:
1
∂x
∂y
1
+ G0 (y) − G00 (y)
=0
−G0 (x) − G00 (x)
2
∂w
2
∂w
s.t.
x=

1 1
1
+ ρĜ1 (x) + (1 − ρ)Ĝ1 (y)
2 2
2

y=

1 1
1
+ (1 − ρ)Ĝ1 (x) + ρĜ1 (y)
2 2
2

and
∂x
∂x
∂y
= 1 − 2ρ + ρĜ1 (x) + ρwĜ01 (x)
− (1 − ρ)Ĝ1 (y) + (1 − ρ)(1 − w)Ĝ01 (y)
∂w
∂w
∂w
∂x
∂y
∂y
= −1 + 2ρ + (1 − ρ)Ĝ1 (x) + (1 − ρ)wĜ01 (x)
− ρĜ1 (y) + ρ(1 − w)Ĝ01 (y)
∂w
∂w
∂w
It is easy to check that x = y satisfies our conditions on x and y, thus we have:
1 1
+ Ĝ1 (x)
2 2
Moreover it is possible to show (it should be) that system of equations for x and y has
only two solution. The first one is x = y = 1. Thus we have:


∂x
∂y
0
G0 (x)
+
=0
∂w ∂w
x=

s.t.
1 1
+ Ĝ1 (x)
2 2
The first solution to the FOC equation is G00 (x) = 0 which implies x = 0. This
∂x
obviously does not satisfy second equation, thus the only possibility left is ∂w
=0
x=
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∂x
∂x
∂y
= 1 − 2ρ + ρĜ1 (x) + ρwĜ01 (x)
− (1 − ρ)Ĝ1 (y) + (1 − ρ)(1 − w)Ĝ01 (y)
∂w
∂w
∂w

∂y
∂x
∂y
= −1 + 2ρ + (1 − ρ)Ĝ1 (x) + (1 − ρ)wĜ01 (x)
− ρĜ1 (y) + ρ(1 − w)Ĝ01 (y)
∂w
∂w
∂w
Solving previous system and substituting y = x we have:

1 − 2ρ − Ĝ1 (x) + 2ρĜ1 (x) − ρĜ1 (x)Ĝ01 (x) + ρĜ01 (x) + 21 Ĝ1 (x)Ĝ01 (x) −
∂x
=−
∂w
− 12 ρ[Ĝ01 (x)]2 + 14 [Ĝ01 (x)]2 + ρĜ01 (x) − 1
1 − 2ρ − Ĝ1 (x) + 2ρĜ1 (x) − ρĜ1 (x)Ĝ01 (x) + ρĜ01 (x) + 12 Ĝ1 (x)Ĝ01 (x) −
∂y
=
∂w
− 12 ρ[Ĝ01 (x)]2 + 41 [Ĝ01 (x)]2 + ρĜ01 (x) − 1
Note that

∂x
∂w

Ĝ01 (x)
2

Ĝ01 (x)
2

∂y
= − ∂w
and thus we have that:


∂x
∂y
0
G0 (x)
+
=0
∂w ∂w

This implies that w =
maximum when ρ < 12 .

1
2

is always the critical point. What is left to proof is that it is

SOC of the problem

∂x
−2G00 (x)
−wG000 (x)



∂w

SOC when w =

∂x
∂w

2

∂2x
∂y
−wG00 (x) 2 +2G00 (y)
−(1−w)G000 (y)
∂w
∂w



∂y
∂w

2

−(1−w)G00 (y)

∂2y
∂w2

1
2

4z(1 − 2ρ)(1 − Ĝ1 (x))

2 ×
2 − Ĝ01 (x) 2 + (1 − 2ρ)Ĝ01 (x) − 2






× (1 − 2ρ) Ĝ01 (x)2 + 2Ĝ01 (x) + Ĝ001 (x)(1 − Ĝ1 (x)) Ĝ1 (x) + 8Ĝ1 (x) + (1 − 2ρ) 2 − Ĝ01 (x) Ĝ01 (x)
−

Thus we can conclude that w =

1
2

is local maximum for ρ <

1
2

if:

2 − Ĝ01 (x) > 0
s.t.
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x=

1 1
+ Ĝ1 (x)
2 2

Let us denote by F (x) = 12 + 12 Ĝ1 (x) then solution to equation x∗ is such that F (x)
crosses 45 degree line in x∗ from above since F (0) = 21 Thus we can conclude that F 0 (x∗ ) <
1. Thus 12 Ĝ01 (x) < 1 and consequently Ĝ01 (x) < 2, which in turn implies that our condition
always holds.
When w = 21 should be preferred to w = 1?
Recall that in the case when w = 12 the size of the giant component is given by:
1
1 1
S( ) = − G0 (x∗m )
2
2 2
x∗m =

1 1
+ Ĝ1 (x∗m )
2 2

On the other hand if w = 1 we have:
S(1) =

1 1
− G0 (x∗b )
2 2

x∗b = 1 − ρ + ρĜ1 (x∗b )
Due to the monotonicity of the G0 (x) we know that S( 21 ) > S(1) whenever x∗m < x∗b .
So basically we should see how ρ affects solution to fixed point problem, since first equation
is just particular case of the second. Using IFT we have:
∂x
∂x
= −1 + Ĝ1 (x) + ρĜ01 (x)
∂ρ
∂ρ
∂x
1 − Ĝ1 (x)
=−
∂ρ
1 − ρĜ01 (x)
Note that x is solution to fixed point of 1 − ρ + ρĜ1 (x) at x∗ it should cross the 45
degree line and this in turn implies that ρĜ01 (x) < 1 thus we have shown that ∂x
∂ρ < 0.
Thus in turn implies that if ρ < 21 x∗b > x∗m and thus S( 21 ) > S(1) on the other hand if
ρ > 12 thus S( 12 ) < S(1)
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